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LOCAL REGULATION OF AIR POLLUTION
I. LOCAL AuTHORiTY
All states have some form of air pollution control, but, recognizing
the desirability of local solutions to local problems,1 many municipal
and other sub-state agencies have enacted ordinances and regulations
designed to curtail local air pollution. These agencies have derived
their power to regulate air pollution from a number of sources, among
them the city's inherent police power,2 charter provisions 3 and state
enabling acts. 4
Generally, a city's "inherent" police power permits it to reasonably
regulate conduct in order to promote the health, welfare and safety
of its residents.3 However, at least one decision holds that a city charter
grants no general police power to a municipality." If the state chooses
1. The Federal Government has specifically recognized the necessity for local action in
this area. See Clean Air Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. 1857(a) (1963) as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1857
(Supp. III, 1968).
2. City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36 Minn. 298, 31 N.W. 49 (1886); City of St. Louis v.
Edward 1Ieitzeberg Packing & Provision Co., 141 Mo. 375, 42 S.W. 954 (1897); Bd. of
Health v. N.Y. Central R.R., 4 N.J. 293, 72 A.2d 511 (1950); City of Cleveland v. Malm,
7 Ohio Dec. 124 (Clev. Pol. Ct. 1898); Sigler v. City of Cleveland, 3 Ohio N.P. 119, 4 Ohio
Sup. & C.P. Dec. 166 (Cuyahoga County C.P. 1896); City of Milwaukee v. Milbrew, Inc.,
240 Wis. 527, 3 N.W.2d 386 (1942).
3. See text accompanying notes 5-7, infra.
4. City of Rochester v. Macauley-Fien Milling Co., 199 N.Y. 207, 92 N.E. 641 (1910)
(control of smoke emission). See generally U. Prrr. HA.TH LAiW CENTER, Introduction
to DIGEST OF MUNICIPAL AIR POLLUTrION ORDINANCES ii (Public Health Service Pub. No.
982, 1962) [hereinafter cited as DIGEST].
5. City of Colo. Springs v. Grueskin, 161 Colo. 281, 422 P.2d 384 (1966) (regulation of
truck cargo); City of Cincinnati v. Burkhardt, 10 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 495, 30 Ohio C.C.R.
350 (1908) (control of smoke emission); State ex rel. Myhre v. City of Spokane, 70 Wash.2d
207, 422 P.2d 790 (1967) (zoning). See Visidor Corp. v. Borough of Cliffside Park, 48 N.J.
214, 225 A.2d 105 (1966) (one-way street ordinance); City of Milwaukee v. Milbrew, Inc.,
240 Wis. 527, 3 N.W.2d 386 (1942) (city has authority from its charter to declare and
punish nuisances). Cf. Erie R.R. v. Mayor of Jersey City, 83 NJ.L. 92, 84 A. 697 (1912)
(unreasonable regulation exceeds city's power). See also Harmon v. City of Chicago, 110
Ill. 400 (1884); City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36 Minn. 298, 31 N.W. 49 (1886); City of St.
Louis v. Edward Heitzeberg Packing & Provision Co., 141 Mo. 375, 42 S.W. 954 (1897).
For a further discussion of the subject of municipal regulation of air pollution with
regard to limits on time of emission, nature of contaminant and water vessels, see 62
C.JS. Municipal Corps., 298 (1949).
6. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp. v. City of Kingsport, 189 Tenn. 450, 225 S.W.2d 270 (1949).
See Parker v. Fairmont, 72 W.Va. 688, 79 S.E. 660 (1913) (only smoke emission that is
nuisance Per se or made a nuisance by statute can be abated).
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to delegate its own power to control air pollution to a municipality,
the grant is frequently formed as a city charter provision authorizing
the city to prevent and abate nuisances. Such provisions are usually
construed narrowly. Many courts have reasoned that the provisions
grant the city only the right to regulate common law nuisances or
nuisances in fact, and not to declare nuisances or control activities not
illegal at common law.7 However, since changes in the charter provi-
sions can circumvent these decisions,8 the town charter can be ef-
fectively used as a source of municipal authority over air pollution. 9
State enabling acts are another source of a city's power to regulate
air pollution. This is probably the most popular method of delegating
air pollution control responsibility to localities. Enabling acts are ex-
ceedingly flexible, allowing the municipalities to meet their own
problems. They do not require the inclusion of specific language in
the town charter,10 and they have been approved by the United States
Supreme Court. 1
Nevertheless enabling acts are not without their problems. First,
early municipal regulations based on enabling acts encountered judi-
cial opposition on the ground that the acts did not specifically provide
for the enactment of the challenged ordinance. 12 Recent cases indicate,
however, that courts may be willing to look more to the intended
7. See Harmon v. City of Chicago, 110 Ill. 400 (1884); City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36
Minn. 298, 31 N.W. 49 (1886); City of St. Louis v. Edward Heitzeberg Packing &z Provision
Co., 141 Mo. 375, 42 S.W. 954 (1897).
8. Ballentine v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378 (1942). See City of St. Paul v.
Haugbro. 93 Minn. 59, 100 N.W. 470 (1904). This decision was followed in City of St. Paul
v. Robbins. 93 Minn. 138, 100 N.W. 1124 (1904).
9. See State v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 114 Minn. 122, 130 N.W. 545 (1911); Ballentine
v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378 (1942); Penn-Dixie Cement Corp. v. City of Kings-
port, 189 Tenn. 450, 225 S.W.2d 270 (1949). Compare Harmon v. City of Chicago, 110 II.
400 (1884), with City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36 Minn. 298, 31 N.W. 49 (1886).
10. Ballentine v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378 (1942); Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.
v. City of Kingsport, 189 Tenn. 450, 225 S.NV.2d 270 (1949).
11. Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 329 U.S. 486 (1916). State enabling acts had
been previously upheld in lower courts. See, e.g., Glucose Refining Co. v. City of Chicago,
138 F. 209 (N.D.Il1. 1905); Ex parte Junga, 10 Cal. App. 602, 103 P. 159 (Ct. App. 1909);
City of Chicago v. Dunham Towing & Wrecking Co., 161 Ill. App. 307 (1911); State ex rel.
Kittenbrink v. Witnell, 91 Neb. 101, 135 N.W. 376 (1912).
12. In Sigler v. City of Cleveland, 3 Ohio N.P. 119, 4 Ohio S. 8. C.P. Dec. 166 (Cuyahoga
County C.P. 1896), an ordinance prohibiting smoke emission was struck down on the
basis that the enabling act had granted the municipality only the authority to regulate
smoke emission, not to declare it a nuisance per se. Compare Commonwealth v. Standard
Ice Co., 59 P.L.J. 133 (Alleghenney C.C. 1911), with Commonwealth v. Pollard, 97 P.L.J.
133 (Alleghenney C.C. 1948). See also City of Cleveland v, Malm, 7 Ohio Dec. 124 (Clev.
Pol. Ct. 1898).
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scope of the enabling act than to its specific language.13 Secondly, ordi-
nances enacted under an enabling act are extremely vulnerable if they
invade an area previously regulated solely by the state or county.' 4
Finally, no matter how the locality is accorded the power to regulate
air pollution, its controls will not be allowed to interfere with state
regulation of certain industries.' 5
II. THE LOCAL PROGRAM: IN GENERAL
Local air pollution control agencies function in geographic areas
of varying size and complexity, ranging from small industrial districts
to county administered programs encompassing many forms of air pol-
lution.' 6The basic strength of these local programs is their ability to
administer closely co-ordinated, day-to-day control over recognized
air pollution sources. This kind of local control is based more on active
officials who are responsive to local problems and knowledgeable of
13. See City of Chicago v. National Brick Co., 331 Ill. App. 614, 73 N.E.2d 647 (1947);
West Bronx Auto Paint Shop, Inc. v. City of New York, 33 Misc. 2d 29, 223 N.Y.S.2d 984
(Sup. Ct. 1961).
14. See Pfister Chemical Co. v. Romano, 15 N.J. Misc. 71, 188 A. 727 (1937). But cf.
Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 637, 96 N.W.2d 85, aff'd
on rehearing, 6 Wis. 2d 423, 97 N.W.2d 423 (1959).
15. Pennsylvania R.R. v. City of Jersey City, 84 NJ.L. 716, 87 A. 465 (Ct. Err. & App.
1913); Verona v. Shalit, 92 NJ. Super. 65, 222 A.2d 145 (Essex Cty. Ct. 1966). Cf. Mayor
of Jersey City v. Abercrombie, 53 A. 73 (NJ. 1904).
16. Albuquerque, N.M., Ordinance 2218, § 2(C), Dec. 18, 1962; Allentown, Pa., Ordinance
9965, § 2, Oct. 30, 1962; Birmingham, Ala., Ordinance 523-F, § 8; BOSTON, MASS., GEN.
LAws ch. 111, § 142A (1961); Charlotte, N.C., Air Pollution Control Ordinance § 3,
March 29, 1967; Chattanooga, Tenn., Air Pollution Control Ordinance § 1-A, proposed
Dec. 7, 1967; CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 17, preamble (1966); CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUN.
CODE ch. 15, § 2500 (1965); Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 428-A-62, ch. 13, § 4.1301, June 18,
1962; Dayton, Ohio, Ordinance 19644, § 1011-1(a), Oct. 19, 1960; Detroit, Mich., Ordinance
167-E, Aug. 15, 1947; East Chicago, Ind., Air Quality Control Ordinance 2884, § 1.2, March
27, 1967; Erie, Pa., City Bill No. 8619, preamble, Feb. 27, 1951; Evansville, Ind., Air
Quality Control Ordinance § 1.2; GARY, IND., MUN. CODE, ORDINANCE 4232, § 2.1, April 4,
1967; GREEN BAY, WIs., MUN. CODE § 20.01; HARTFORD, CONN., MUN. CODE ch. 31 (1967);
Kansas City, Kan., Ordinance 46114, preamble, Feb. 1, 1967; LANSING, MICH., CODE ch. 21,
art. 2 (1958); Los Angeles, Calif., Rules and Regulations r. 2(g), March 3, 1967; MADISON,
Wis., BUILDING CODE § 17.97 (1965); Nashville, Tenn., Air Pollution Control ch. 15, art. 3
(proposed); New Haven, Conn., Ordinance 329, § 1, May 4, 1953; New York City, N.Y.,
Ordinance 14, § 892-1.0, May 20, 1966; PHILADELPHIA, PA., AIR POLLUTION CODE tit. 3
(1954); PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE § 1301 (1960); ROCHE=STR, N.Y., CODE ch. 100 (1951); St. Paul,
Minn., Ordinance 9275, preamble, May 14, 1949; Spokane, Wash., Ordinance C2804, May
1, 1916; TOLEDO, OHIO, MUN. CODE, art. 60 (1962); Tulsa, Okla., Ordinance 10819, § 3,
June 9, 1967; Youngstown, Ohio, Ordinance 54639, Feb. 13, 1952 [hereinafter cited by
dty name and pertinent section].
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local conditions than the threat of sanctions imposed by a totally com-
prehensive ordinance. 17 Although these local agencies are more sus-
ceptible to special interest groups and more wary of offending industry
than their state, interstate, or federal counterparts, this same proximity
provides them with the expertise to deal with local problems, and
incidentally makes them more accessible to both complaints and lob-
bying from regulated industries.' s
More often than not, however, the ideal of local administrators main-
taining close surveillance over specifically defined problem areas is not
only unrealized but unsought. According to a poll conducted by this
publication, only 16 of 55 jurisdictions had either effected or proposed
modern approaches to air pollution within the last five years.19 Only
a handful appear to have based a local air pollution program on the
peculiar strength of local regulation.20
III. THE ADIINISTRATION OF LocAL CONTROLS
The structure of local air pollution agencies follows no identifiable
pattern. This survey is meant only to outline some of their characteris-
tics and suggest how they might be most effectively structured.
The tasks of the local agencies are frequently divided into four
categories: Advisory, Legislative, Executive and Appellate. One body
may operate in two, three or even all of these areas.21
17. DIGrST at iii; see Clean Air Act of 1963, 42 U.S.C. § 1857b(a), (b) (1963) as amended
42 U.S.C. § 1857b(a), (b) (Supp. III, 1968), where the Federal Government recognized the
effectieness of local officials by making available to them information, funds, training
and "encouragement." See also note 18, infra.
18. STATE AND LocAL PROGRAMS IN AIR POLLUTION CONTROL 3 (Public Health Service
Pub. No. 1549, 1966); STAFF OF SENATE Co,,MirrrEE ON PUBLIC WoRKs, 88TH CONG., 1sT
SESs., SitDY OF POLLUTION-AIR 36 (Comm. Print 1963).
19, Bi mingham, Charlotte, Chattanooga, Chicago, Cincinnati, East Chicago, Evansville,
Gary, Green Bay, Hartford, Kansas City (Kan.), Los Angeles, Madison, Nashville, New
York City and Tulsa.
20. DicrS at iv 9- v. See, e.g., Charlotte § 1; Chicago § 17-2; East Chicago § 1.3; Gary
51.3; Pittsburgh § 1302. Each of the sections defines the city's standards in such a way as
to facilitate fast and efficient enforcement, on a continuous basis. For a list of typical
definitions, see TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BRANCH-RoBERT A. TAFT SANITARY ENGINEERING
CENTER, A CO.MPILATION OF SELEcTED Am POLLUTION ErIISSION CONTROL REGULATIONS AND
ORDINANCES 4 (Public Health Service Pub. No. A65-34, 1965). See also Birmingham § 1;
Wichita 1 7.40.010. Tulsa, while broadly defining air pollution as any material or substance
that is offensive to humans or animals, lists only seven definitions, none of which define
tests or specific pollutants. Tulsa § 1.
21. E.g., Green Bay § 20.04; Chicago § 17(13); Philadelphia § 3-304.
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The advisory duties of the local agency are generally carried on by
a board containing from five to fifteen members, sitting for terms of
between two and five years. The members are usually required to be
acquainted with or professionally related to air pollution abatement
problems.22 Charlotte's advisory board, for example, must consist of a
professional engineer, a physician, two industrial representatives, one
agricultural representative, one person from the general public, and a
lawyer.23 In general the boards are independent of the executive 24 and
without power to enact either regulations or guidelines.2r At least one
city has made the consent of the advisory board necessary before the
director can recommend new rules or regulations for adoption by the
city.26 But no matter how new rules are proposed, the legislative func-
tion is usually performed by an independent body.27
There are two disquieting features to separate advisory and rule-
making boards. First, separating the power to regulate from the power
to study and propose regulation offers both the advisory board and
the true legislative organ the opportunity to blame the other for in-
adequate results. 28 In addition, such separation gives special interest
groups another opportunity to impede the air pollution abatement
process. To avoid these problems, information, power and responsi-
bility should be located in one body. Secondly, despite the explicitness
with which the ordinance may describe the members of the board,
unless the ordinance specifically provides that no special interest group
may dominate its membership, it is possible that a majority of the
board will espouse an industrial viewpoint unfavorable to proper
pollution controls. This is possible even if the board's membership is
as specifically defined as that of Charlotte.
At the executive level, most local air pollution organizations rely
22. E.g., Chicago § 17-16. "Since many local programs were originally directed only at
smoke control the personnel employed were often selected for their knowledge of fuel
firing practices. The more diverse and complex sources which now present the major
problems are often outside their area of competence. In such situations there may be a
natural inclination for them to concentrate efforts on only those probelms (sic) which
are familiar." SENATE CoMMirEE ON PUBLIC Wo, s, A STUDY oF POLLUTANTS-AIR, 88TH
CONG., 1ST SESS. 36 (1963).
23. Charlotte § 2.
24. E.g., Birmingham § 8; Chicago § 17-17; Cincinnati § 2500-6; East Chicago § 2.4;
Tulsa § 8.
25. E.g., Chicago §§ 17-15, 17-16; Charlotte § 2; Evansville § 2.4(a).
26. Chicago § 17(13)(11).
27. E.g., Nashville § 3.1521 (Board of Health); Tulsa § 8 (Board of Health).
28. DIGEST at iv.
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on a chief of staff, who is charged with the primary responsibility for
enforcing local air pollution ordinances and regulations. The ordi-
nances usually require some professional qualifications for this office.
The executives' responsibilities include administrative duties, the
recommendation of standards, enforcement, and the dissemination of
information to the public.29
The chief administrative officer generally has several officials under
his supervision, who periodically inspect local sources of air pollution.3 0
These officials represent the strength of local air pollution programs,
since they are able to police local sources of pollution closely and
continually. The effectiveness of a local air pollution program rests
on their performance. The potential concurrance of interest between
local inspectors and local industry therefore has been recognized offi-
cially in at least one ordinance,31 but it is unlikely that any provision
in an ordinance can wholly eliminate this problem.
The final level of a typical air pollution authority is the "Appeal
Board." Though often an independent body,32 sometimes its functions
are combined with those of the advisory board.33 Such combinations
appear unsatisfactory, for they may not adequately provide impartial
review.
Like the advisory boards, the appeal boards are usually composed
of three to seven members representing various interests of the com-
munity as well as technical, legal and political personnel. 4 Procedure
before a local board is usually governed by the ordinance itself.35 Typ-
ically, after an adverse decision by the executive organ an aggreived
party is given a certain number of days to file an appeal. The director
of the regulatory board then delivers all relevant data to the appeal
board.38 Subsequently a hearing date is set and notice is given to all
parties. The hearing may be closed or open to the general public. At
the hearing the parties are entitled to be represented by counsel,
evidence may be introduced, testimony received and witnesses cross-
examined. 37 A transcript of the proceeding is kept, since most ordi-
29. E.g., Gary § 2.2; East Chicago § 2.2.
30. Eg., Chicago §§ 17-3, 17-11; Gary §§ 2.1(B), 2.3(A).
31. Gary 2.3(B).
32. Chicago § 17-20; Detroit art. 1, § 1.4, art. 2, § 2.28-9.
33. E.g,, Green Bay § 200.02(2); East Chicago § 2A.
34. E.g., Chicago § 17-20; East Chicago § 2.4; Evansville § 2.5.
35. E.g., Chicago §§ 17-20, 17-21.
36. E.g., Chicago § 17-21; Dayton § 848-13; East Chicago § 2.5; Erie art. 5; New Haven
§ 4; Tulsa § 9.
37, Chicago § 17-2; DIGEsT at vi.
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nances provide for judicial review of the appeal board's decision.88
Judicial review is generally limited to matters of law rather than a
trial de novo.3 9
IV. METHODS OF CONTROL
Older attempts at local control relied primarily on broad catch-all
sections forbidding pollution dangerous to health.40 Most modern
ordinances combine these with other sections setting specific stan-
dards,41 such as those dealing with the specific amount of pollutants in
the atmosphere in terms of either opacity, released particulate matter,
or both.42
A. The General Provisions
Most jurisdictions have enacted air pollution ordinances consistent
with the common law concept that the emission of air contaminants
having a detrimental effect on health, comfort and property of any
citizen constitutes a nuisance.43 These ordinances are broadly phrased;
for example, a Kansas City ordinance provides:
No person shall cause or permit the discharge from any source
whatsover such quantities of air contaminants or other material
which cause injury, detriment, nuisance, or annoyance to any
considerable number of persons or to the public or which en-
38. E.g., Chattanooga § 8-E; Evansville § 2.5; Gary § 2.6.
39. DIGsr at vi.
40. See Spokane § 2; see also Wichita § 7A0.040(3), (1965).
41. Cincinnati § 2500-3 (general), §§ 2501-15 to 2501-18 (specific); Dayton § 848.8
(general), § 848-6 (specific); Erie § 3 (general), § 1 (specific); Philadephia § 3-101 (general),
§ 3-102 (specific); cf. Birmingham § 2, which prohibits only "emissions into the atmosphere
from fuel burning equipment of smoke of Chart 3 shade or darker." This standard is not
applicable to several of the specific pollutants. It would appear from the title of the
ordinance ("An Ordinance to Provide for the Abatement of Smoke, Soot, Fumes and
Gases') that other specific pollutants are to be regulated. Since the tests for these other
pollutants are not specified, one would assume that common law nuisance is the test
imposed.
42. Charlotte § 13; Chicago § 17-2(2, 69), 17-24; Detroit art. 1, § 1.44, art. 2, § 2.4A;
East Chicago § 3.1; Gary § 3.1, art. VI, § 6.1-4; Los Angeles reg. IV, r. 50, 52; Pittsburgh
§ 1305.2, .4.
43. Albuquerque § 3; Allentown § 1(a); Charlotte § 13(D); Chattenooga § 1-A; Chicago
§§ 17-27, 17-28; Cincinnati § 2501-3(b); Cleveland § 4.0507-08; Dayton § 848-8; East Chicago
§ 6.10; Gary § 6.11; Green Bay § 20.02(1); Hartford § 31.4; Kansas City § 9; Lansing § 21-
16; Los Angeles r. 21-16; Madison § 17.97(5)(b); Nashville § 3.1528; New Haven § 1;
Philadelphia § 3-102(3); St. Paul § 5(); Spokane § 2; Toledo § 2; Tulsa § 5; Youngstown
§ 34.10.
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danger the comfort, repose, health, or safety of any such persons
or the public or which cause or have a tendency to cause injury
or damage to business or property.44
The value of such general ordinances is limited. The judicial standard
applied is whether the municipality is "reasonably" regulating the
offender. Consequently, in order for prosecution or injunction to be ef-
fective the agency must show to the court's satisfaction that the emis-
sions have caused, are causing, or will cause the harmful effects pro-
hibited.4 " But ordinances of this type do provide some flexibility for
the municipality in responding to newly arising air pollution problems.
It is possible that the rule making power of some of the agencies
could be used in conjunction with the "catch-all" ordinances to in-
crease flexibility in dealing with local problems, but these rule making
powvers are also limited. Before the agencies can enact or consider new
rules they generally must hold public hearings open to all residents
of the area affected by the proposed ordinance.46 Ideally, the advisabil-
ity of the rule or ordinance should then be weighed in the light of
both present and future considerations. 47 Considerations, hearings and
rule drafting take time.
B. Specific Controls
Most ordinances specify both (1) types of pollutants and (2) types of
sources to be regulated. These ordinances reflect a disposition not only
to prohibit air contamination, but to indicate the means by which it
is to be prevented. 48 Thus, sections dealing with pollutants establish
44. Kansas City § 9.
45. Erie R. Co. v. City of Jersey City, 83 N.J. 214, 84 A. 697 (1912); City of Cincinnati
v, Burkhardt, 10 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 495, 30 Ohio C.C.R. 350 (1908); City of Milwaukee v.
Milbrew, 240 Wis. 527, 3 N.W.2d 386 (1942). Cf. City of Colo. Springs v. Grueskin, 161
Colo. 281, 422 P.2d 384; People v. Long Island R.R. Co., 31 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Ct. Spec. Sess.
1941). But it is not likely that modern courts will narrowly construe "reasonableness." See
City of Rochester v. Macauley-Fien Milling Co., 199 N.Y. 207, 92 N.E. 641 (1910) (unless
unreasonable on its face as a matter of law, court of appeals is bound by trial court
holding of reasonableness) (regarding smoke emission controls); State ex. rel. Myhre v.
City of Spokane, 70 Wash.2d 207, 422 P.2d 790 (1956). The value of the ordinance seems
entirely dependent on the local bench. It is much easier for the agency to prove a violation
of fixed emission standards than to meet the burdens of such an ordinance, and therefore
the effect of definite standards of potential offenders is undoubtably greater.
46, E g., Charlotte § 2; Chicago § 17-31(11).
47. E.g., Chicago §§ 17-13(7), -18; Nashville lists the Air Quality goals at Nashville
3 1520. The Nashville ordinance also provides for more stringent standards to take effect
within a giv en period from the enactment of the ordinance. Nashville § 3.1502(1).
48, All of the ordinances in the survey adopt this dual regulatory scheme.
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tests and standards, 49 while those concerned with sources provide for
improvement in machinery design and encourage the use of pollution-
control devices. Among regulations dealing with specific emissions
those most often mentioned are soot, cinders, dust, odors and smoke,
although these are by no means the only ones. 0
Standards utilized for specific pollutant regulation may be phrased
in terms of (1) maximum optical density of the effluent based on
particular time periods 1 or (2) a maximum particulate or gas content
for effluent emissions, usually stated either in terms of particulates per
unit of weight of contaminant lost per weight of material processed by
the equipment.52 These standards may not be constant throughout the
entire municipal area and may vary according to which zones within
a city produce the greatest amount of pollution.53 Usually a combina-
tion of (1) and (2) is utilized, with the manner of combination depend-
ing on the pollutant being regulated.5 4
49. E.g., Dayton § 848.6; Green Bay § 20.09; Pittsburgh § 1806-09; Saint Paul § 5.
50. The following abbreviations will be used: smoke(s); gases(g); dust(d); fumes(f);
mist(m); odors(o); vapors(v); radiations(r); soot(so); cinders(c); oxides(ox); acids(a); solids
(sol); ash(ash); liquids(l). After each city the section of the ordinance where the specific
emissions prohibited are listed will be noted. Albuquerque (so, c, d, g, s, f) (§ 4(A));
Allentown (s, g, d, f, m, o, v, r) (§ 1(a)); Birmingham (s) (§ 2); Boston ("one or more
contaminants") (p. 171 DIGEsT); Charlotte (all encompassing) (§ 1); Chattanooga (a, o, m)
(§ 10); Chicago (all encompassing) (§ 17-2); Cincinnati (d, f, s, so, o, "other materials")
(§ 2500-8); Cleveland (d, f, g, m, v, o, s, so, c) (ch. 1); Dayton (s, g, a, d, c, f, so, o) (§ 848-5);
Detroit (s, so, c, a, f, g, d, ash) (Art. 2 § 2.1); East Chicago (all encompassing) (§ 1-3 (1));
Erie (s, so, d, c, g, v, f, o) (Art. 4 § 8); Evansville (o, d, f, g, m, s, so, w) (§ 1.3); Gary (so,
ash, d, c, a, f, o, g, v) (§ 21.8(1)); Green Bay (s, d, g, so, f) (§ 20.01); Hartford (s, so) (§ 31.2);
Kansas City (s, so, a, c, d, f, g, v, 1, o) (§ 1(1)); Lansing (sol, v, m, a, f, g) (§ 21-18); Los
Angeles ("air contaminants') (Rule 51); Madison (g, a, d, s, so) (§ 17.97(5)(b)); Nashville
(so, d, ash) (§ 3.1501(1)); New Haven (s, d, o) (§ 1); New York (so, s, ash, g, f, v, o) (§ 892-
10); Philadelphia (a, f, g, m, o, s, v) (§ 8-101); Pittsburgh (all encompassing) (§ 1302(1));
Rochester (s, a, g, o, d, so, c, ash) (§ 100); St. Paul (so, s, d, m) (§ 5); Toledo (d, g, f, m,
v, s, o) (§ 3-60-7(1)); Tulsa (all encompassing) (Definitions); Youngstown (so, c, a, f, g)
(§ 34.12).
51. A typical provision is that of Los Angeles, r. 50:
A person shall not discharge into the atmosphere from any single source of emission
whatsoever any air contaminants for a period or periods aggregating more than three
minutes in any one hour which is:
a. As dark or darker in shade as that designated as No. 2 on the Ringelmann Chart,
as published by the United States Bureau of Mines, or
b. Of such opacity as to obscure an observer's view to a degree equal to or greater
than does smoke described in subsection (a) of this Rule.
52. DiGEsT at v. Due to individual problems facing each community, there are many
variations in this type of standard. See, e.g., Los Angeles Rules 52-54 and New Haven § 6.
It would be advisable for a drafter to check the ordinances of communities having prob-
lems similar to his own.
53. E.g., Kansas City § 5(B)(2); Tulsa § 3.
54. Pittsburgh § 1306-09; St. Paul § 5-7.
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The second method of control, i.e. regulation of the various types
of air pollution sources, generally starts with a prohibition of the use
of equipment or fuels knowrn to cause pollution. The prohibition may
be effected by using any one of four general methods: (1) forbidding
the use of certain types of fuel,55 equipment, 56 or activity; 57(2) estab-
lishing minimum design standards for pollution causing equipment;58
(3) establishing operational standards,59 and (4) requiring the use of
specific types of control equipment techniques.60 To be effective, the
requirements just mentioned must be stringent enough that com-
pliance with any one of them will meet the minimum standards of
any other requirements of the code.'
Other measures available to the locality if it chooses to directly
regulate "pollution sources" include (1) permits, (2) registration cer-
tificates of operation and (3) restrictions on the sale of equipment.
Under the permit system, designs, operational descriptions, or other
data concerning the operation of an air pollution source are submit-
ted to the appropriate authority before the operation is commenced.62
The authority may then prevent or permit the operation based on
its determination of the potential threat to air purity. 3 Generally, the
permit system applies only to the construction of new air pollution
sources or to major repairs of an existing operation. Consequently,
55. E.g., Chattanooga § 10, Rule 4; Nashville § 3.1503(1). "Where certain fuels are a
source of air pollution, the use or composition of such fuels may be regulated by such
means as requiring the washing, cooking, briquetting of coal, etc., the specification of
smokeless grades of fuels, the reduction of the sulfur content of fuel oils, reduction of the
olefinic hydrocarbons in gasoline, regulation of liquid vapor pressure, etc. In such cases,
regulation usually affects the producer or vendor, rather than the consumer of these fuels."
DIGEST at v.
56. E.g., Chicago §§ 17-43 to 17-47 (surface-burning types of equipment, refuse burning
equipment); Nashville § 3.1504(l) (hand-fired burning equipment).
57. Chicago §§ 17-30 (open burning), 17-31 (construction, demolition or wrecking fires),
17-33 (storage of materials susceptible to becoming windborne); Gary §§ 6.5 (storage of
petroleum), 6.9 (open burning).
58. Detroit § 4.6; Toledo § 3-60-7(6); Youngstown § 34.28.
59. E.g., Green Bay § 20.09; Youngstown § 34.28 (steam railroads or locomotives using
solid fuels).
60. Green Bay § 20.07; Rochester § 100-5; Youngstown § 34.12. There are a variety of
exemptions to these provisions. The most common exclude private dwellings with a
maximum number of families and minor repairs from compliance with the provisions
of the act. See, e.g., Birmingham § 13 (two family or less dwellings); Los Angeles 11(c)
(four family or less dwellings) and Rule 11(m) (minor repairs). The categorization used
appears in DIGEST at v.
61. DIGEST at v(c).
62. E.g., Cleveland § 4.0901; Philadelphia § 3-301.
63. DIGE-T at v. See, e.g., East Chicago Art. III, § 3.1; Gary § 4.1; Los Angeles Reg. II, r.
10(a).
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the system is useful only in conjunction with a means of regulating
operative air pollution sources. Its major advantage is that it reduces
the need for the air pollution agency to maintain a large staff of in-
spectors to seek out and eliminate air pollution sources. Eventually,
it would seem, all equipment in use will have passed through this
initial screening. 64
The certificate of operation closely resembles the permit. But in-
stead of certifying a potential air pollution operation before it begins,
ordinances utilizing this method provide that the air pollution sources
are to be tested during operation. The certificate is issued if the tests
show that the standards established by the locality are met.05 These
certificates generally specify, inter alia, the type of fuel and operational
method to be used by the holder,66 and are valid only for a limited
period of time.67 While the certificate system has the advantage of en-
abling the agency to regulate pollution sources with a great degree of
certainty, it too creates problems. First, it requires the agency to em-
ploy a larger staff. Secondly, it is economically undesirable from an
industry's viewpoint: a considerable amount of time and labor can be
wasted while machinery is being tested and evaluated.
The third of these preventive measures restricts the sale of equip-
ment known to produce air pollution. Such regulation may take the
form of an outright prohibition of sale within the locality's jurisdic-
tion;68 requiring that a seller obtain a permit to sell the equipment;60
or that the equipment itself be approved.70 These restrictions are often
the least satisfactory preventive approach since they afford the operator
no chance of modifying the equipment in order to comply with the
standards of the area.
Both the "permit" and "sale restriction" methods share the short-
coming of relying at least in part on non-objective determinations by
the authority. The "certificate of operation method," though based
on substantive data gathered from an actual emission, seems prag-
matically undesirable. On this basis, the "emission control" regulations
64. Senate Committee on Public Works, A Study of Pollution-Air, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
36 (1963).
65. Albuquerque § 5; Gary § 4.11.
66. Pittsburgh § 1310.6.
67. Cleveland § 4.0903.
68. Chicago § 17-45; Nashville § 3.1503.
69. Los Angeles r. 10 (f); Youngstown § 34.21.
70. Chicago § 17-46.
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appear more flexible and probably more useful, at least in a complex
industrial area.
C. Registration Provisions
Identification facilitates enforcement of both "emission" and "source"
control ordinances. Consequently, several localities have provided for
the registration of regular or anticipated sources of emissions.71 For
example, the Charlotte ordinance provides in part: "Persons owning or
engaging in operations which may result in or contribute to air pol-
lution shall, upon request, supply information including, but not lim-
ited to, location of operation, size and height of pollutant outlet, ex-
pected effluent rate and duration, and composition of air contaminant
discharge." 72 These provisions serve to assist the agency in determining
reasonable emission standards for given areas, along with enabling it
to more easily locate pollution sources.
V. ENFORCEMENT
A. The Means of Enforcement
Local regulations are enforced by processes similar to those used
by the states in enforcing state-wide regulations. For example, a local
air pollution agency may utilize a right of entry to discover viola-
tions. 3 Once a violation has been found by this or any other method,
the offender may be considered guilty of causing a public nuisance or
committing a misdemeanor. Thus, he may be subject to fines, injunc-
tions, or the sealing of his equipment.
If an ordinance declares air pollution to be a public nuisance7 4
an injunction is the normal method of enforcement,7 5 though other
remedies are available. Four cities, however, provide that a violation
of ordinance provisions constitutes a misdemeanor.7 6 Such provisions
71. E.g., Charlotte § 4; Gary § 4.14.
72. Charlotte § 4.
73. Albuquerque § 8. "The Health Authority, during reasonable hours, for the purpose
of enforcing or administering the Air Pollution Control Ordinance or any rule or regu-
lation promulgated pursuant thereto, may enter any building, premise, or other place, and
may stop, detain, and inspect any vehicle. Any person knowingly interfering in any way
with the performance of the duties of the Health Authority may be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor and may be subject to the penalties hereinafter provided."
74. East Chicago § 6.11; Green Bay § 20.02; Rochester § 100-3; Tulsa § 5.
75, DIGrsr at vi(5). Abatement, meaning an injunction, is normally the judicial reaction
to a nuisance.
76. Albuquerque § 13; Charlotte § 19; St. Paul § 10; Tulsa § 11.
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differ from the "nuisance" type of ordinance since the penalties are
made specific, usually in terms of either a maximum or both a mini-
mum and maximum penalty. Graduated penalties for successive viola-
tions and provisions that each day's violation shall constitute a sep-
arate offense are also common,77 as are provisions authorizing the
agency to issue cease and desist orders against violators after providing
them an adequate opportunity to present objections.78 If such orders
are not appealed through the courts, they become final. Failure to
comply is punishable by fine or imprisonment.7 9
Sealing the violator's operation is an extreme remedy used prim-
arily to enforce compliance with the permit and registration sections
of the regulations 0 or to assure that adequate corrective measures are
taken after a violation is brought to an offender's attention.81 The New
York ordinance provides a typical example of a sealing provision:
The commissioner may seal any equipment installed or operated
without a permit as herein required. The commissioner may also
after notice and hearing, seal any equipment or prohibit any
process responsible for the emission into the open air of harm-
ful or objectionable substances, and may prohibit the operation
thereof until an operating certificate has been obtained.8 2
B. Exceptions to Enforcement
A succinct and typical variance provision appears in the Albuquer-
que ordinance:
The Health Authority may hold a public hearing to determine
under what conditions and to what extent a variance from the
requirements of the Air Pollution Control Ordinance or any
rule or regulation established under its provisions is necessary
and will be permitted. The Health Authority shall specify the
duration of a variance, which shall not be longer than one year,
77. E.g., Albuquerque § 13; Chicago § 17-19; Green Bay § 20.15.
78. E.g., Dayton § 838-12; Pittsburgh §§ 1313, 1314; Youngstown §§ 34.10, 34.34,
79. DIGEST at vi(5).
80. New York, § 892-6.0.
81. Evansville, § 11.1.
82. New York, § 892.60. See also Gary, §§ 4.7, 4.10(b); East Chicago, §§ 4.8, 4.10. If a
proposed installation, construction, reconstruction, or alteration for which a permit was
required is not completed within a given time period (e.g., one year in Gary), several
ordinances provide that the permit will become null and void and all fees will be
forfeited. In such cases, even if the construction is completed within the limit set but,
upon testing, the equipment fails to meet the requirements and limitations of the
ordinance, a certificate of operation will be withheld pending changes in the processing
methods, fuel or refuse burning procedures or control equipment.
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but such variance may be continued from year to year without
another hearing on the approval of the Health Authority. The
Health Authority may revoke or modify any order permitting
a variance. 83
Similar provisions are found in almost all ordinances, and are useful
when the regulations would lead to unduly oppressive results without
corresponding benefit.
C. Emergency Provisions
Of those cities polled, only two have emergency pollution provisions.
The Los Angeles provision "is designed to prevent the excessive build-
up of air contaminants and to avoid any possibility of a catastrophe
caused by toxic concentrations of air contaminants."' 4 It provides both
a method of determining the existence of such a catastrophe and the
action to be taken in the event the catastrophe arises.85
VI. RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE
This study was compiled from the answers from the 55 cities respond-
ing to a questionnaire distributed by this publication. Seventy-five
localities were initially included in the survey, four of which indicated
they had no air pollution program and twenty of which responded
after the deadline set for inclusion. The primary focus was on cities
with a population of over 500,000 persons, especially those with na-
tionally recognized air pollution problems. A random poll of smaller
communities was also taken. Due to the nature of several questions
asked, confidentiality was promised. For this reason, specific localities
making each response will not be noted.'
Size of the Staff
As previously noted, four of the cities responding indicated they
had no air pollution staff. The size of the staffs in the remainder
83. Albuquerque, § 7.
84. Los Angeles, Preface to rules 150-52.
85. Id.
86. The cities which most courteously responded are: Akron; Albuquerque; Allentown;
Belh'ille; Birmingham; Boston; Buffalo; Camden; Charlotte; Chattanooga; Chicago;
Cincinnati; Dallas; Dayton; Denver; Detroit; Deluth; East Chicago; Evansville; Erie; Fort
Worth; Gary; Houston; Indianapolis; Kansas City, Kan.; Kansas City, Mo.; Lansing; Los
Angeles; Louisville; Madison; Milwaukee; Minneapolis; Montgomery; Nashville; New
Haven; New Orleans; New York City; Okahoma City; Philadelphia; Phoenix; Pittsburgh;
Rochester; Sacremento; St. Louis; San Antonio; San Diego; Seattle; Spokane; Toledo;
Trenton; Tulsa; Wichita; Youngstown.
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ranged from one to 305 members, although the 305-member body
was responsible for more than one urban area. Full-time employees
totalled 1,126 persons; part-time, 26 persons. Five of the cities em-
ployed part-time help but only one used part-time employees exclu-
sively. The average number of full-time employees was six.
It is estimated that between 1952 and 1961 the number of personnel
in local air pollution control agencies increased by about one third,8 7
one of the largest increases being recorded in California.88 The size of
the staff employed appears to be a function both of the size of the urban
area served, and the age of the agency. There were 37 more local
agencies in 1961 than in 1952, but, with the exception of the new
agencies in California, only five of these employed more than two
people.89
Only thirty per cent of the localities polled indicated that their
present staff was adequate to meet current needs, whereas 36 cities
said their staff was inadequate, suggesting increases varying in size
from one new employee (a 100 per cent increase) to 80 additional em-
ployees (a 25 per cent increase). The largest percentage increase sug-
gested was 500 per cent, but this agency had only one employee. The
most frequently suggested increases ranged between 30 and 50 per cent.
Size of Area Covered
The size of an area covered by an air pollution staff ranged from
seven square miles to an entire state. The average area covered by a
single agency was over 760 square miles, or more than 35 square miles
per staff employee.
Size of Budget
Four cities could not accurately estimate their budget because it
was included in the total appropriation of another department. The
total budget of the 47 cities which were considered in this inquiry was
$13.8 million. This was an average of $287,000 per city, although the
mean budget of the cities surveyed was only $84,000. Four cities had
budgets in excess of $1 million and six had budgets of $10,000 or less.
Only six of the cities said they were receiving federal aid. Fourty-six
87. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 88TH CONG., IST SESS., STUDY OF POLLUTION
-AIR 36 (Comm. Print 1963).
88. Id. California employed 3.6 times as many employees as in 1952.
89. PUBLIC HEALTrH S- avic, supra note 87.
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per cent of the localities indicated that their budgets were sufficient for
present purposes."
Although no question was asked concerning the size of employees'
salaries, a recent survey revealed that the median annual salary for
engineers employed by city air pollution control agencies was $2,200
less than the median salary for all other engineers.9 '
Sources Presenting Substantial Problems
Localities nationally notorious for excessive air pollution were asked
to list the major sources of emissions in their areas. Choices included,
among others, industry, automobiles, private open burning, refuse
burning and "other." Thirty-nine cities, 75 per cent of those respond-
ing, indicated that industrial sources presented a substantial problem.
The industrial sources and the number of cities which felt that such
sources created a major problem were: coal burning-22; chemical
emissions-20; foundries-17; oil burning-15; sand and dust-
four; particulates-three; building materials-two; waste fires-one;
glass and fiberglass-one; paper and pulp processes-one. Ninety per
cent of the cities felt, however, that industry generally cooperated
with municipal control programs, and none of the cities felt that their
present regulations hindered industrial operations.
Seventy-one per cent of the cities indicated that automobiles created
a substantial problem; 44 per cent indicated private open burning,
and 56 per cent indicated refuse burning. Other sources most often
cited w%ere: fuel burning (oil or coal); refiners; fly ash; and dust.
Most Effective Detecting Devices
a. For Smoke
Fifteen of the 38 cities responding to this specific question relied on
the naked eye for the detection of smoke pollution. Fourteen cities
used the Ringelmann Chart; six used the AISI system. Other methods
used include the Beckman sampler, the Hi-Vol tester, the soiling in-
dex and the dust fall cans.
90. For a discussion of federal aid and the budgets of the 50 largest cities, see PUBLC
HEALTH SERVICE, STATE AND LOCAL PROGRAMS IN AIR POLLUTION CONTROL 7-8 (Public Health
Service Pub. No. 1549, 1966).
91. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, supra note 87.
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b. Detection of Other Forms of Pollution
The devices used for the detection of air pollution other than
smoke and the number of cities using each were: S02 candles or analyz-
ers-six; Hi-Vol testers-five; infrared-four; eye-three; dust fall
buckets-three; Beckman samplers-two; sequential samplers-two;
Davis analyzers-two; nose-two; Stacy emission rate samplers-one,
and fly ash and cyclonic arrestors-one.
Statutes and Ordinances
Fifty-four per cent of the cities included in the survey considered
their states' present enabling acts sufficient; 33 per cent felt them to
be inadequate; 12 per cent felt that they were sufficient in some areas
but lacking in others, and in one per cent of the cities the enabling acts
were viewed as conflicting with present municipal ordinances.
Seventy-eight per cent of the cities responding considered the pres-
ent ordinances not sufficiently stringent; 19 per cent felt that their
present ordinances were adequate, and three per cent indicated that
their ordinances were adequate in some aspects but in need of amend-
ment in others.
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